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John J. Cali School of Music, Montclair State University, Montclair, NJ, United States
The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the nature of “meaning” and
“meaningfulness” in the context of instrumental music education. By doing so, I propose
to expand the ways in which instrumental music educators conceive their mission and
the ways in which we may instill meaning in people’s lives. Traditionally, pursuits of
philosophical deliberation have claimed that meaningfulness comes from either personal
happiness (e.g., Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill) or an impersonal sense of duty
(e.g., St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Immanuel Kant). However, philosopher
Wolf (2010) criticizes these positions in favor of a broader perspective, one that arises
from understanding that there is a third sort of value, namely “meaningfulness.” Rightly
understanding meaningfulness may help us engage more fully with a greater sense
and understanding of the full potentials of eudaimonia: a life of significance and
value for oneself and one’s community. Therefore, this paper links meaningfulness
to a 4E (embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended) account of “sense-making”
in/for instrumental music education. In doing so, I discuss the aims of public-school
music education; aims that engage teachers and students in meaningfulness—a
meaningfulness that is ethical, embodied, enacted, and extended—in, with, and through
musics and, more directly, “instrumental” music making.
Keywords: sense-making, instrumental music teaching and learning, enaction and embodied cognition,
eudaimonia (well being), meaningfulness and motivation
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, “instrumental music education” denotes the education of music through the learning
and playing of musical instruments. While I am not going to argue with this prevailing assumption
across our profession, I would like to expand our understanding of the natures and values
of instrumental music education. Thus, what might be another way to interpret instrumental
music education? Another adjectival meaning of “instrumental” connotes a helpful means to an
oftentimes unforeseen end. In this context, I would like to ask, “instrumental” for what? For what
might instruments be instrumental in helping students of all ages achieve?
The purpose of this paper is to investigate an integrated sense of “meaningfulness” both in
life, more generally, and for instrumental music education, more specifically. Thus, this paper
will proceed in four sections. First, I will briefly sketch out a 4E concept (embodied, embedded,
enacted, and extended) of “sense-making.” Then, I will discuss meaningfulness. Next, I will relate
sense-making to meaningfulness. I will conclude by linking sense-making and meaningfulness to
instrumental music education.
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Please note: While the quest for understanding the “meaning
of life” is perennial and increasingly important, I will not attempt
to address this question here. Instead, and following Wolf (2010,
2016), I examine what gives meaning to life. Asked differently,
what is “meaningfulness” and why should instrumental music
education care about this concept?
SENSE-MAKING
What does it mean to make “sense” of—to understand, feel,
or engage with—something? Here, I would like to explore a
4E concept of “sense-making,” or a concept of mind that is
embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended. Though before
doing so, please note that “embodiment,” “embeddedness,”
“enaction,” and “extension” are essentially “contested concepts.”
Why contested? Because experts across varying fields (e.g.,
philosophy, neuroscience, psychology) have disparate views
regarding each of these concepts. Thus, each concept warrants
specific examination. However, due to the nature of this present
philosophical investigation, I present a cursory sense of each,
and, when needed, supply related literature that explores the
individual components of a 4E concept more fully.
So, let us start with the nature of enaction, as “enaction” is
the core of 4E cognition, and of being in the world. “The praxis
of our living,” state Maturana and Varela (1992), is “enactive”
(p. 241). In brief, what this means is that our understanding
of our own existence comes from how we engage as selves
and bring about ourselves in the world. Thus, as Stewart et al.
(2010) explain, beings “enact” the worlds they live in; worlds
and beings do not and cannot exist apart from one another;
moreover, beings make it true that their “effective, embodied
action in the world actually constitutes . . . perception and thereby
grounds . . .[their] cognition” (p. viii). Note: Cognition is not
“brain based,” but is, rather, enacted through a seamless set of
processes and systems among the intersections of brain, body,
and environment. Stated differently, to “enact” ourselves and our
worlds, we put ourselves and our worlds “into existence through
our action” (Gallagher and Lindgren, 2015, p. 392). In sum, as
Gallagher and Lindgren (2015) write: “Cognition, as embodied
and enactive, is not exclusively the result of neural processes
in the head”; cognition is “accomplished in a dynamic set of
interactions between brain and body, and between body and
environment” (p. 394).
Following from this, and among numerous variables,
people/agents are “coupled” to and with their surrounding worlds
or “embedded” into contexts that contribute to a sense of
ourselves, our place in the world, and give way to each and every
motivation that propels us forward in our lives. Additionally, our
“coupling” speaks to the dynamic, intersubjective nature of self
and of an embodied perception (Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009).
“Embodiment” refers to the many ways in which our
corporeality determines our place in and sense of the worlds in
which we live. Because we are “actors” (Gallagher and Lindgren,
2015) —and because we enact our sense of self and world—
we are feelingful, embodied beings. Without our bodies and
our embodied involvement in time and place, we can have
no real sense—literally and metaphorically—of ourselves and
others. A 4E concept of engaging in the world is used, here, to
emphasize the ways embodiment, and the ways in which human
beings are simultaneously autonomous and interconnected—
through feeling-and-knowing—to our contexts and worlds (e.g.,
Varela et al., 1991; Thompson, 2007; Di Paolo et al., 2010;
van der Schyff and Krueger, 2019).
Importantly, and by way of explaining “extension,” Noë (2009)
states our brain, body, and the environments we participate
within not only complement each other, but, moreover, enact our
sense of self, the world, and our intimate, interconnectedness to
the worlds in which belong. Now that some of the individual
components of a 4E concept are illustrated, what is meant by
“sense-making”?
Noë’s concept of perception, cognition, and embodiment as
brain-body-world is foundational for any 4E approach to sense-
making. By “sense-making,” I am exploring both the literal—
i.e., as in making sense of something or someone—and the
physical—i.e., as in feeling-through a stimulus of any kind.
Therefore, in line with both Noë (2009) and Gallagher (2017), an
enactive perspective on sense-making acknowledges that human
beings have evolved the ways they have because we possess a
brain in a body that is not isolated in the world. Instead, the
brain is “dynamically coupled to a body that is dynamically
coupled to an environment” (Gallagher, 2017, p. 115). Further,
the “organism”—or the brain-body-mind system—is “operating
within the situation itself rather than on a model of the situation
inferred by the brain” (p. 115). This thesis notes that such a
coupling of brain-body-environment comes to be because of
and through the very nature of our “neuronal processes, bodily
movements, affects, anatomy and function, and environmental
regularities” (Gallagher, 2017, p. 115).
It is essential that, at this point, we note predecessors of any
4E concept of sense-making. Poincaré’s (1907) research on spatial
perception, Piaget’s (1936) work on sensorimotor equilibrium,
and Goldstein’s (1934/1995) investigations of self-actualization all
point to a 4E concept of sense-making.
Philosophers, too, contribute to a 4E concept of sense-making.
For example, Experience and Nature (Dewey’s, 1925/1958)
examines our embodied human experiences both in and of the
worlds in which we engage. Thus, 4E principles are foreshadowed
in Dewey’s investigation of our worldly “transactions1”—
where body, mind, and world come together to form an
interconnectedness of meaning-making potentials. Notably, in
his analysis of Dewey’s connections to enactive principles,
Gallagher (2017) explains that Dewey’s (1894, 1895) early theories
on emotion emphasized two points worth mentioning: first,
emotion is action; second, “emotions are not reducible to a
set of bodily states since the body is always coupled to an
environment, and always includes situational aspects” (p. 63).
Other philosophical roots of a 4E concept of sense-making
trace to the phenomenology of Heidegger (1962, 1968, 1969;
specifically, and among other aspects, Heidegger’s “being in
1The word “transaction”—which denotes the ways subjects/objects come together
and are, not only fused, but are changed due to their coming together—here is
taken from Dewey and Bentley’s (1949) Knowing and the Known.
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the world” and pragmatist perspectives of our environments
and its tools being “ready-to-hand”), Husserl (1960, 1980, 1989;
specifically, and among other aspects, Husserl’s investigation of
“perception” of the environment and its tools and the potentials
found therein), and Merleau-Ponty (1948/2004, 1962, 1964;
specifically, and among other aspects, Merleau-Ponty’s sense of
“embodiment,” which is somewhat explored later in this paper).
Contemporary research within the sciences—see the
work of Hutchins (1995) and Beer (2003)—have important
compatibilities with a 4E approach. While research of Damasio
(1994, 2009, 2010), Clark (1997, 2006)2, Hurley (2002), LeDoux
(2002, 2019), and Prinz (2012) does not necessarily utilize the
combined terms “embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended,”
important principles of 4E sense-making underlie their research.
Di Paolo et al. (2010)—with their enactive concept of the mind
(for discussions about their work in relation to music and music
education, see e.g., Silverman, 2012; van der Schyff, 2013)—also
examine the ways in which we are embodied, embedded, enacted,
and extended beings.
Within the field of philosophy, Noë (2004) and Thompson
(2007) state, perception and consciousness and, therefore, sense-
making, all happen because of the numerous interactions
among brain, body, and world (Silverman, 2012; Elliott and
Silverman, 2015). Without these components and interactions,
consciousness cannot occur, nor does it exist (e.g., Noë, 2004;
Thompson, 2007). And without consciousness there is no sense
of sense-making. Furthermore, and most importantly according
to Thompson (2007), no enactment of self.
A theme shared by all these scholars needs special emphasis
because it shatters a longstanding dualism, which in turn blocks
a fuller understanding of “self ” or “personhood.” That theme
is: A being that possesses cognition does not exist “out there”
solely in the world. Instead, a being that possesses cognition
is, as Thompson (2007) states, “a relational domain enacted
or brought forth by that being’s autonomous agency and mode
of coupling with the environment” (cited in Silverman, 2012,
p. 99; italics mine). Therefore, and stated differently, cognition
occurs because one’s personhood is not only interconnected,
relational, and essentially enmeshed with the worlds that one
inhabits; cognition and personhood are possible because of this
coupling between self and world (see Gallagher, 2005, 2017;
Thompson, 2007).
Similarly, and in line with these above-mentioned scholarly
predecessors, van der Schyff and Krueger (2019) examine a
4E account of the mind, perception, and, therefore, of identity
formation. They explain that sense-making involves more than
just mental and emotional processes, but also engages bodily and
environmental factors (see also, Noë, 2004, 2009; Thompson and
Stapleton, 2009; Gallagher, 2017). As Krueger (2018) states:
we routinely “offload” our thinking onto body and world.
Tilting our head to make sense of a rotated image or text, for
2I am grateful to a reviewer of this paper who pointed out that, while Clark’s work
does presage 4E conceptions of being in/of the world, “his theory of extended
cognition”—which is primarily a “computational model of human cognition”—
seems to run contrary to many of the foundational principles of the majority of the
scholars explored throughout this paper (e.g., Varela et al., 1991; Thompson, 2007;
Gallagher, 2017).
example — instead of rotating an internal representation —
reduces information-processing demands . . .. Similarly, we use
gesture to represent solutions to mathematical problems . . .
sketchpads to scaffold artistic creation . . ., models to better
understand scientific theories . . ., and smartphones, search
engines, and cultural institutions to support memory. . .. These
beyond-the-head targets of our offloading generate ongoing
feedback loops that transform our cognitive profile in real-time
and, in so doing, help us negotiate complex cognitive tasks. From
a 4E perspective, understanding how minds work requires looking
beyond heads. And for a 4E view called the “extended mind
thesis,” these materially scaffolded feedback loops are so important
for driving thought and experience that they should be seen as part
of the (extended) mind itself. (p. 1)
All these integrated components—or a 4E concept of sense-
making—provide important considerations in understanding
human consciousness and personhood. A 4E concept of sense-
making is essential to all we think, believe, value, and do—
including music making. However, before we can conclude
anything further about determining value for ourselves, let us first
consider the nature of “meaningfulness.”
MEANINGFULNESS
As alluded to at the outset of this paper, to possess “meaning” is
not necessarily the same as something being “meaningful”
(James, 2010; Wolf, 2010; Metz, 2011; Thomas, 2019).
Still, examinations of both the “meaning of life” and
“meaningfulness in life” fall under the domain of fields related
to practical reasoning and ethics. In Western philosophical
traditions, attempting to understand the “meaning of life” and
“meaningfulness in life” is perennial and dates back to ancient
Greece. Even though Williams (1981) notes there are sometimes
short-sighted attempts to answer these increasingly important
questions, we owe it to ourselves to continue to attempt to
think through what “meaning in life” is and why thinking
about this matters.
Still, while Socrates’ axiom is that “the unexamined life is not
worth living,” both Williams (1981, 1983, 2012/1993) and Wolf
(1982, 2010) point out that we may lead meaningful lives without
giving much thought to conceptualizing where that “meaning”
may come from Silverman (2013) and Elliott (2020). Indeed,
the “desires” and motivations that provoke, inspire, and “propel
one forward do not have to be very evident to consciousness,
let alone grand or large; one good testimony to one’s existence
having a point is that the question of its point does not arise,
and the propelling concerns may be of a relatively everyday kind
such as certainly provide the ground of many sorts of happiness”
(Williams, 1981, p. 11).
Regardless, as professionals, we must consider what makes
life, music, music teaching and learning, and instrumental music
education “meaningful” if, for no other reason, than to well
understand the nature and values of our work (Elliott and
Silverman, 2015). So, what is meant here by “meaningfulness”?
Wolf (2010, 2016) examines “meaningfulness” by comparing
and contrasting two prominent positions within the field of
ethics: the Fulfillment View and the Larger-than-oneself View.
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The Fulfillment View suggests that we experience meaning
when we are fulfilled. The Larger-than-oneself View, notes
Wolf, recognizes we experience meaning when we find ourselves
serving the needs of that which is beyond ourself. Both
viewpoints, state Wolf, are critical components in understanding
the motivations of people with that which tends to fuel our lives.
However, according to Wolf (2010), while human motivation
is categorized in one of two ways, egoistic (and self-interested)
or altruistic (and moral), such motives may not fully capture the
reasons for what propels us in our lives. As Wolf (2016) states,
motivations that may not be egoistic or altruistic “are neither
peripheral nor eccentric. To the contrary, they are the reasons and
motives that engage us in the activities that make our lives worth
living” (p. 254). So, we might ask: What kind of motivations
are neither egoistic or altruistic, and what is the “distinctive
character” (Wolf, 2016) of such motivations that challenge this
simplistic dualism?
James (2010), Wolf (2010, 2016), Metz (2011), and Thomas
(2019) all seem to maintain that “meaningfulness” may come
about when we love people, objects, and/or activities that are
worthy of love. Wolf (2010, 2016) provides specific examples such
as visiting relatives who would feel better being visited, helping
friends relocate, as well as making her daughter’s Halloween
costume. In each instance, Wolf (2010) notes: “I act neither out
of self-interest nor out of duty or any other sort of impersonal or
impartial reason. Rather, I act out of love” (p. 26).
Again, and for emphasis given where we are headed with this
paper, “reasons of love” (Wolf fittingly utilizes Harry Frankfurt’s
terminology) move us to purposefully engage in a variety of
activities and interests that fill our lives (Silverman, 2013). In fact,
and further, we may act from reasons of love for which “reason”
(i.e., logic, contemplation, and/or conceptualization) has very
little business. We do not need to notice the value that something,
someone, or some activity possesses prior to having “reasons of
love” for which meaningfulness is the result (Frankfurt, 2004).
Oftentimes, we act meaningfully before even noticing how or in
what ways our pursuits seem meaningful.
Please note: Wolf does not suggest we remove the egoistic
or moral activities and interests from our lives. What she is
suggesting is we might benefit from recognizing whether such
activities and interests provide meaningfulness for us. In other
words, if we focus on meaningfulness instead of self-fulfillment
or altruism, we may find we possess much more meaning in our
lives. Or, we may find we could use more meaning for ourselves
in our everyday lives.
So, when I am called to perform challenging “new” (for me)
music, I often “over prepare.” Something similar happens when
I plant and weed the tomatoes, basil, and flowers on the balcony
of my apartment (even though the height of my balcony bothers
me); or when I attempt to photograph a butterfly who just landed
on a flower (as frustrating as this may be, given butterflies tend
not to sit still for photographs); or when I purchase and wrap
birthday presents for those people who are important to me.
What motivates me to practice, garden, take pictures, or seek
out the perfect present exists outside myself (Wolf, 2010, 2016;
Silverman, 2013). What draws me to do these things is love.
I do not care if these activities are “good for me.” Aesthetic
theories of art suggest that I practice for “music’s sake” or
take pictures for “art’s sake” (e.g., Wimsatt and Beardsley, 1958;
Scruton, 1999; Reimer, 2003). But, as Carroll (2010, p. 86) states,
“doing something for its own sake” is as unfounded as it is
simplistic; Wolf (2016) notes believing this is equally “misleading
and obscure as well as pretentious” (p. 255). Rather, “reasons
of love” motivate me to engage in these pursuits (Wolf, 2010,
2016; Silverman, 2013). Thus, states Wolf (2016), “reasons of
love”—whether of people, ideals, or other sorts of objects—have
a distinctive and important role in our lives,” all which have little
to do with “self-interest” or “morality” (p. 255).
Wolf (2016) is keen to point out that, just because we are
motivated by “reasons of love,” such motives may not justify
potential outcomes. Might I “scare away” the butterfly I am
attempting to photograph? Or, could I mis-interpret the piece
of new music I’m learning? And might I, inadvertently, pull out
some of the roots of my tomato plants while attempting to rid
them of weeds? Indeed, says Wolf, and, moreover, “the energy
and attention” I may give to the activities, objects, or persons
“may be disproportionate” to what is warranted by the activities,
objects, or persons (p. 255). And in such instances, claims Wolf,
such actions on my part will not eventuate in meaningfulness
because the “worthiness” of my behavior is not independent
of my own agenda.
Markedly, meaningfulness comes about “when subjective
attraction meets objective attractiveness, and one is able to do
something about it” (Wolf, 2016, p. 261). Additionally, says Wolf,
value, and therefore meaningfulness, occurs only when one is
“actively (and lovingly) engaged” and when there is “objective
worth” in the pursuits one finds valuable. This view, or the
“Fitting Fulfillment View,” is not meaningful says Wolf (2016)
because of the ways we feel when so engaged. Instead, we find our
lives meaningful because we are interested in “being” the kind of
person who loves activities, objects, and persons that are worthy
of our attention, dedication, and energies:
We do not satisfy those interests simply by thinking or feeling that
they are satisfied any more than we satisfy our interest in not being
alone simply by thinking or feeling that we are not alone. To have a
life that not just seems meaningful but is meaningful, the objective
aspect is as important as the subjective. (Wolf, 2016, p. 263).
At this point, a reader may be suspicious of such a perspective
about meaningfulness. Thankfully, Wolf (2010, 2016) is careful
to explain the potential issues inherent with her thesis. One of
these is to ask: Is there really such a thing as “objective value”? To
challenge readers’ suspicion, and instead of asking this question,
she proposes we ask: “Which projects are valuable?” and “Which
activities are worthwhile?” (p. 264). These questions are free for
each and all to ask and answer. Thus, she states:
I assume that we will answer them better if we pool our
information, our experience, and our thoughts. Presumably, the
task of determining which activities and projects are worthwhile
is a never-ending process, both because, as fallible creatures, our
judgments of value will always be somewhat tentative, and because
at some level the sorts of things that have value are apt to change
over time. The absence of a final authority on the question of
which things have value, however, does not call into doubt the
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legitimacy or coherence of the question itself or of the enterprise
of trying to find a more or less reasonable, if also partial, tentative,
and impermanent answer. (Wolf, 2016, p. 264)
Why is this the case? We find value in objects, activities, and
people because we are social beings who engage in social practices
toward “some kind of practical end” (Elliott and Silverman, 2015,
p. 51). In the case of my flute playing, gardening, or photography,
all are social practices that showcase the integration of people,
processes, products, and contexts. Related to this, we find that the
human “goods” or values—or meaningfulness—are determined
“by and for the people who are involved” within each social
practice “itself ” (Elliott and Silverman, 2015, p. 51).
By looking at how and why certain types of project or activity
provide meaning for the people who engage in them (and also
perhaps at what can interfere with these activities’ potential for
meaning) we can better understand these activities and what
we get from them without making comparative or universal
judgments. We can perhaps also better design such activities and
projects in a way that is likely to enhance their potential meaning




In many respects, meaningfulness and sense-making share
common thrusts. Notably, meaningfulness as related to sense-
making casts light on how we interpret the things in our life
that give us a sense of “purpose” as well as that which we deem
valuable for our overall flourishing. Such purpose is embodied,
embedded, enacted, and extended, whether or not we “verbalize”
or “conceptualize” these pursuits. How so? As Thompson and
Stapleton (2009) write:
even the simplest organisms regulate their interactions with the
world in such a way that they transform the world into a place
of salience, meaning, and value—into an environment (Umwelt)
in the proper biological sense of the term. This transformation of
the world into an environment happens through the organism’s
sense-making activity. (p. 25)
Thus, one of the main aims of sense-making is defining
value—whether consciously or non-consciously—for the agents
within their social worlds and contexts. In discussing the
“meaning” of meaningfulness, or, rather, meaninglessness,
Eagleton (2007) notes that people who feel that their lives “lack
meaning” are actually expressing their “lives lack significance.”
What this points out, says Eagleton, is such lives “lack point,
substance, purpose, quality, value, and direction” (p. 64). So, as
Thomas (2019) delineates, “when someone desires a life which
is meaningful, they are essentially hoping for a life which is
sense-full or full-of-sense” (p. 1558).
Relatedly, as already explored above, Wolf (2010, 2016)
maintains that meaningfulness connects us to place, persons, and
projects of love; such love indicates “value.” What does this mean
for instrumental music making and, therefore, instrumental
music education? In Music Matters (Elliott and Silverman, 2015),
David Elliott and I examine important dimensions of
personhood, and some of the numerous ways in which we
bring our self-other worlds into holistic being, and, moreover,
the many ways music and music education matter. There, we
make a case for—without then stating so—a 4E perspective of
sense-making, meaningfulness, and music and music education:
the holistic nature of you is always greater than the sum of
your unified processes. These are always in a continuous state
of modification and change. So personhood includes but is not
limited to self-awareness, self-identity, spirituality (and more) that
emerge from your intrapersonal and interpersonal interactions
with your socially situated communities, norms, and values. All
dimensions of personhood make all others possible. Take one part
away and personhood will be impaired to some degree or another.
Your unified nature is what enables and powers the you-ness of
you as an extraordinarily complex being that experiences everyday
life as a seamless flow of conscious and non-conscious experiences
of all kinds (thoughts, intuitions, emotions, sensations, memories,
etc.). (italics in original; p. 157)
We examine, moreover, the ways in which we are complex
beings; beings who come to be because we are “completely unified
(embodied), interdependent, and actively engaged in enacting
or bringing about our self-other worlds into being” (pp. 156–
157). So, personhood is not located within us in a singular
way. Instead, persons emerge—and understand themselves as
persons—and are enacted because of the “dynamic syntheses”
of our many “embodied processes” that are in/of our worlds.
Because of this, we explore some of the many swirling ways—
e.g., attention, perception, cognition, emotion, memory, volition,
and/or conscious-and-non-conscious states of experience—that,
in combination, make up our embodied, embedded, enacted, and
extended account of sense-making and, therefore, “personhood”
(Elliott and Silverman, 2015).
Importantly, our personhood comes about because of our
body mapping abilities, which are inclusive of, among other
aspects, mirror neurons (Elliott and Silverman, 2015). For present
purposes, we might ask why and how is it that a “body comes to
mind” (Damasio and Damasio, 2006, p. 16; Johnson, 2007) when
frightened, or hungry, or feeling joy or “chills” during a powerful
musical experience, or when having bodily experiences of singing,
blowing air through a flute, or strumming a guitar (Elliott
and Silverman, 2012, 2015; also see, Bowman, 2004; Bowman
and Powell, 2007)? Along with other researchers, Damasio and
Damasio (2006) contend that in addition to chemical and neural
signals and multiple personhood systems that flow both to and
from the brain, we have a biological scaffolding system—or, stated
differently, body mapping—that affords our “minding the body”
and “em-bodying the mind” in a dynamic dance, as two partners
would dance across the world with each other (Damasio and
Damasio, 2006; Elliott and Silverman, 2015).
Please note: while Damasio’s research primarily utilizes
“brain-centered” terminology, limiting Damasio’s work to the
brain’s neuronal networks as they engage the body would
diminish its scope. As Damasio (1994, 1999, 2010) examines, the
body is intimately involved in all sorts of conscious and non-
conscious processes; we might refer to such bodily involvement as
“background feelings.” Moreover, Damasio (1994) explains that
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consciousness can be understood as “the feeling of life itself, the
sense of being” (p. 150). In other words, Damasio’s (1999, 2010)
research acknowledges that consciousness is “the feeling of what
happens” or the “feeling of what it is like to be oneself.” And while
the brain is essential in our “minding our body,” our “bodies” are
the “vessels” in which we are interconnected to our worlds.
Returning to body mapping, most of our body maps are
located in the brain’s cerebral cortex. For example, the primary
visceral map is your body-brain-mind’s way of creating a
representation of your internal processes: “This map is uniquely
super-developed in the human species, and it gives you a level of
access to the ebb and flow of your internal sensations unequaled
anywhere else in the animal kingdom” (Damasio and Damasio,
2006, p. 17). This mapping system captures a huge range of
our body states and environmental-world-context experiences
that occur moment to moment, which cause us to experience
continuous changes in everything we think and do.
Thus, when a flute player “cracks” a note while playing a
particularly high-register passage, or a violinist uses a bowing
pattern that does not suit a melody she is interpreting, the
embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended mind—depending
on levels of experience—works to help readjust things. Also, our
body-mapping systems continuously update our maps in relation
to everything we see, hear, taste, touch, think, feel, intuit, sense,
and otherwise experience (Elliott and Silverman, 2015).
Relatedly, body maps are plastic; they shift, modify, and
mature over a lifetime (Blakeslee and Blakeslee, 2007, p. 1).
Thus, as anthropologists tell us that, because our bodies are
not only biological, but also ecological, phenomenological,
social, cultural, gendered, and conjectural (at the very least),
cultures have their own ways of knowing-through-the-senses
and, therefore, engendering and enculturating people’s body
maps (Elliott and Silverman, 2015; see also Johnson, 2007).
Varying with the culture, then, a person’s senses of “sight,
sound, touch, taste, smell, balance, and personal space are all
mapped differently” (Blakeslee and Blakeslee, 2007, pp. 207–
208). The same thing applies to musical sounds, felt musicing
and listening, and musical-emotional experiences (Krueger, 2009,
2018; Elliott and Silverman, 2015).
Additionally, body maps function to create a personal space
around us (technically termed “peripersonal space”), which
extends outwardly depending upon the “tools” we typically use
(Blakeslee and Blakeslee, 2007, p. 127). Through special mapping
procedures, our brains extend and add this space to our limbs and
body: “In each social context, you choose your comfort zone and
broadcast it to others with body language, eye contact, posture,
facial expression, and how you listen” (Blakeslee and Blakeslee,
2007, pp. 127–128). When objects and people enter your domain
and peripersonal space, specific brain cells and networks fire up.
So, physiologically, we have our own “personal bubbles” that
surround us wherever we go; they inform us, not only about
a vast range of details in our world-environments-contexts, but
also about our potential to perform actions in or enact—e.g., to
bring to mind, consciousness, empathy—our own spaces.
One consequence of this extraordinary human attribute
is that the objects, artifacts, tools, and technologies we use
frequently in our daily lives—whether musical instruments,
computer keyboards, social media, bicycles, automobiles—feel
like extensions of or natural parts of our personal selves,
especially when we use them often and become skilled in their
use (Elliott and Silverman, 2015). Understanding our use of tools
in this way gives more fuel to the claim that “you are what you
do.” Such doing is not only embodied in that it is intimately
felt, it informs who we are and hope to become. Our identities
are shaped and reshaped depending on the habits we form, the
embodied engagements we produce, and the ways in which tools
are associated with our thinking-knowing-doing.
So, when a person plays, say, the cello frequently, her cello and
bow feel like a part and extension of her body. Consequently,
and due to the nature of specific instruments, a trombone
player’s peripersonal space is mapped very differently than a
piccolo player’s peripersonal space. As Alperson (2008) notes:
“Many musicians put the matter clearly when they speak of their
instruments as extensions of their bodies. The truth is that it is
difficult to say where the instrument ends and the rest of the
body begins. In this sense, musical instruments are embodied
entities” (p. 40).
Now it makes sense to discuss the subtle difference between
a “tool”—like the musical instrument of a music maker—being
either an “extension” of, or “incorporated” into, a person’s
peripersonal space. Consider Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) famous
case of the blind man and his cane. I quote it here at length
for emphasis:
The blind man’s stick has ceased to be an object for him, and is
no longer perceived for itself; its point has become an area of
sensitivity, extending the scope and active radius of touch, and
providing a parallel to sight. In the exploration of things, the
length of the stick does not enter expressly as a middle term: the
blind man is rather aware of it through the position of objects
than the position of objects through it. The position of things is
immediately given through the extent of the reach which carries
him to it, which comprises besides the arm’s own reach the stick’s
range of action. The points in space do not stand out as objective
positions in relation to the objective position occupied by our
body; they mark, in our vicinity, the varying range of our aims
and our gestures. To get used to . . . a stick is to be transplanted
into [it], or conversely, to incorporate [it] into the bulk of our own
body. (p. 143)
As Merleau-Ponty points out, the man who is adept at utilizing
a cane to “extend” his reach is, in fact, not merely extending his
peripersonal space, but is, in fact, incorporating the cane into his
body’s schema. Additionally, the cane is no longer an object “out
there” in space for use; it has become a part of his personhood.
So, continuing to follow Merleau-Ponty who discusses an
organ and an organist, musical instruments, in the “hands”
of those who habitually use them—or, in the habitus of
our personhood processes—take on similar, if not a further
“incorporated” significance. How? As Tanaka and Donnarumma
(2019) explain, the organist knows, in an embodied way, the
various mechanisms of an organ: its pedals, pulls, and stops.
While musicing, “she incorporates” how the mechanics of the
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organ—especially one she knows well3—can allow her to “achieve
given musical and emotional values” (p. 82). The organist’s
“gestures draw ‘affective vectors’ mediating the expressiveness of
the organ through her body. The organist does not perform in
an objective space, but rather in an affective one” (p. 82). This
kind of embodied epistemology is the basis of a musicer’s enactive
knowing, thinking, and doing (Tanaka and Donnarumma, 2019;
see also, Varela et al., 1991; Di Paolo et al., 2010; van der Schyff,
2013; Matyja and Schiavio, 2013; Elliott and Silverman, 2015; van
der Schyff and Krueger, 2019).
Still, perhaps the distinction between “extension” or
“incorporation” related to a body’s use of a musical instrument
needs further refinement. For this, let us turn to Thompson and
Stapleton (2009) and their discussion of the “body-as-object” and
the “body-as-subject” (p. 29). Drawing from the work of Legrand
(2006, 2007) and Thompson and Stapleton (2009) state:
The body-as-object is the body perceived and recognized as mine
(e.g., “These are my hands.”). The body-as-subject is a structure of
experience; it is that through which the world is experienced. As
such, the body-as-subject is transparent: “The body is transparent
in the sense that one looks through it to the world. At this
level, pre-reflective bodily experience is precisely the experience
of the world as given through the ‘transparent body.’ The latter
is not perceived as an object but experienced specifically as a
subject perceiving and acting, that is, in-the-world” (Legrand,
2007, p. 504 cited; p. 29).
As Thompson and Stapleton note, tools and resources—
and, yes, musical instruments—are “incorporated” by the body
and acquire this “transparency” (p. 29). A musicer’s musical
instrument is no longer an “object” outside of the body, thereby
extending the body’s “reach.” Instead, the musicer experiences
the world through the instrument; the instrument, following
Thompson and Stapleton, “has become transparent” (p. 29).
What does this mean for personhood and therefore sense-
making? They sum up by stating that for something external
to a person’s body to become part of one’s “cognitive system”—
even more, I would argue, as metacognitively part of her sense of
personhood—the external entity “must function transparently in
the body’s sense-making interactions with the environment” (p.
29). They continue by stating “that tools and aids that conform to
transparency are incorporated into the neurophysiological body
schema” (p. 29).
What might the above mean for instrumental music
education? Hopefully, some conclusions may seem self-evident
at this point, namely that instrumental music education is
instrumental in expanding the potentials of students’ personhood.
In expanding students’ personhood, students’ potentials are, too,
expanded. And, instrumental music students-as-music makers
expand their worlds—both metaphorically and quite literally—
by increasing “the reach” of their peripersonal space, body maps,
and embodied capacities and capabilities (to varying degrees).
3Interestingly, when a musician borrows an instrument that does not belong to
her, a period of embodied “adjustment” is necessary. This is why some pianists—
like Vladimir Horowitz—travel with their own pianos. It is difficult to gauge the
differences among instruments’ “handling.”
Another important conclusion is that instrumental music
teaching and learning should be guided by a philosophy of music
education that embraces 4E understandings of a person’s sense
of self and personhood (van der Schyff, 2013). A philosophy
of music education such as the one explored in Music Matters
(Elliott, 1995; Elliott and Silverman, 2015) has the potential
to provide logical foundations and pragmatic principles for
ensuring that the facilitation of people’s sense-making (musical
and otherwise) and personal identity development is ethical and
beneficial in many ways. Thus, a praxial orientation focuses on:
• The why–what–how–where–when of effective, democratic,
and ethical informal and/or formal education in, about, and
through all forms of music-making—including performing,
improvising, composing, arranging, conducting/leading,
music and dancing, musical therapeutic participations, etc.
• Empowering people to make and listen to music with an
“ethic of care”—care for individuals and their communities.
(Elliott and Silverman, 2015)
Music education and, therefore, instrumental teaching and
learning, should be guided by musical mentors’ informed and
ethical dispositions to “act truly and rightly” with continuous
concern for protecting and advancing meaningfulness, human
flourishing, and wellbeing (Elliott and Silverman, 2015; Smith
and Silverman, 2020). From this viewpoint, musical mentors
who are solely concerned with teaching instrumental musicing
techniques are not engaged in praxis—ethical knowing, thinking,
and doing—and praxial musical personhood formation. To
promote a socially constructive and ethical musical personhood,
musical mentors of all kinds must harness musical affordances
with a conscious commitment to an “ethic of care” and care-
guided actions.
A central humanistic purpose of musical involvements
and instrumental teaching and learning is to pursue what
Aristotle and many other philosophers consider the highest
human values: a “good” life of flourishing, wellbeing, fellowship,
meaningfulness, virtue, and happiness for the benefit of oneself
and others. All these values can be summarized by one
word: eudaimonia. If we conceptualize and engage with musics
as musical praxes—a “move” that emphasizes the critically
reflective and ethical dimensions of instrumental musicing and
listening—all forms of ethically minded music-making offer
potential opportunities for pursuing eudaimonia. In addition, if
mentors examine and guide musicing and musical personhood
formation in relation to praxial concepts and eudaimonia, it
is more likely that musical and personal identity construction
will become central aims of informal and formal school and
community music programs.
CONCLUSION
Why should we consider a 4E foundation of sense-making
in relation to instrumental music education? Primarily, and
conceptually, unless we understand the multi-layered nature
of personhood and all it entails, we run the risk of lessening
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the importance and intricacies of all that goes into everything
we say, think, believe, do, value, and create. And because
in many respects sense-making is integral to being, all we
value—whether that “value” be egoistic, altruistic, or from some
other perspective—stems from our personhood as embodied,
embedded, enacted, and extended.
Additionally, we might consider that, while egoism and
altruism are typically deemed as opposites, this assumption rests
on a premise that does not fully consider a being’s embodied,
embedded, enacted, and extended personhood. Indeed, as John
Donne pointed out, “no man is an island entirely unto himself ”;
we are interconnected to each other and to our worlds, and
our sense of self happens because of our interconnectedness
(Pettersen, 2011). Because of this, how we understand our selves
and our worlds come from 4E sense-making. Relatedly, and
because we are embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended
beings with a personhood, our values (e.g., including the habitus
of meaningfulness), too, are interconnected to our worlds around
us. Thus, meaningfulness shares many commonalities with care
and care-fullness (Gilligan, 1982). How? Because when we find
meaning in our lives, we (consciously or non-consciously)
connect to persons, objects, and projects that grab hold of our
care, commitment, and love.
Meaningfulness takes on new dimensions when considered
from 4E perspectives: it, too, is embodied, embedded, enacted,
and extended. Its subjective, objective, and intersubjective
dimensions come about because we make it true that such
reasons of love are important because of the ways in which
those persons, objects, and projects connect us both to ourselves
and our worlds in significant ways. Please note and by way
of reminder: Such value-creating as “meaningfulness” need not
be a conscious deliberation. In fact, meaningfulness may not
be recognized until after the persons, objects, and projects are
already engaged or enacted.
Following from this, sense-making and meaningfulness take
on new perspectives when we consider the ways in which
activities, persons, and, yes, even instruments matter—to both
our sense of personhood and as ways we engage with/in/through
projects of love with the world. Why? Because as instrumentalists,
and through instrumental music education, people who learn
to perform, improvise, and compose (with new media or
conventional instruments and vocal ensembles), and who thereby
participate in the caring for, maintenance, fluidity, reinvention,
and advancement of various instrumental music praxes, the
people of those praxes gain yet another internal good. They
achieve what MacIntyre (1984) calls a certain kind of life (p. 190;
see also, Sparshott, 1988). Importantly, engaging in instrumental
musicing and listening ethically adds meaningfulness to the
content and continuousness of one’s sense-making, and therefore,
one’s life in the world. By entering into, learning, and expanding
musical praxes through living a part of one’s life as a musicer—
whether amateur or beyond—a student (child through adult)
gains a valued way of being and becoming: she gains the unique
value of living out a greater or lesser part of her life as a maker of
musics (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 190). Summarily, when instrumental
music students enter into musical praxes as active, reflective
practitioners, they not only potentially develop “a certain kind of
life” through musics (Regelski, 2005, 2016; Elliott and Silverman,
2015). Their teachers also create conditions for a sustained
development of their students’ personhood.
Thus, learning to be an instrumental musicer of a reasonable
range of musical praxes is one of several viable educational
ends for all people. Consider the many musical activities one
can pursue as an instrumentalist, depending upon the musical-
social practices involved: performing, composing, improvising,
arranging, conducting/leading, recording, producing, musicing
and dancing/moving, musicing and worshiping, and more.
An instrumentalist can become a coach and teach one or
more musics to others, whether formally or informally. An
instrumentalist can write about music, lecture about music,
collect artifacts that surround musical ways of being (e.g.,
recordings, letters from famous instrumentalists), read about
music, discuss music, argue about music, and so forth. And as
a listener of music making—whether as an instrumentalist or
not—one can “maintain the fabric that connects one to others”
(Wolf, 2010, p. 130), knowing that a “bond exists” between self
and others in intimate ways, especially given’s music’s (emotional,
social, cultural) potencies (Elliott and Silverman, 2015).
In many ways, we can draw similarities between the above
and Noë’s (2015) examination in Strange Tools of organized
activities. For Noë, the organized activities (i.e., social practices)
found across the arts possess ways for us to understand how
we come to be through the usage of art’s “strange tools.” Why
“strange”? Strange because the tools we habitually use (e.g., music,
musical instruments, etc.) let us “know ourselves better”; they do
their best work “where, as a matter of habit, we find ourselves”
(Noë, 2018, p. 35). Such self-finding, according to Noë, is a
“phenomenon of entanglement” where “what we do” and “what
we use” and “how we use ‘tools’ of all kinds” bring about “who we
are” and “what matters most” to us.4
Fundamentally, then, instrumental musicing is something
worth doing for the sake of the self and others (Elliott
and Silverman, 2015), and because of this—note: there is
both subjective and objective “value”— instrumental musicing
provides a potential vehicle for meaningfulness. As stated in
Music Matters:
the internal goods and values of musicing are not abstractions.
Through the progressive development of musical understanding
with musical and educative teachers and facilitators, all students
can achieve human flourishing, communal well-being, an
empathetic sense of self-and-other, as well as a sense of
meaningfulness, enjoyment, and a creative way of life. (Elliott and
Silverman, 2015, p. 280)
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